Notes

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1. This question is not the same in Vavuniya, which has a different "documentary regime," given its differential location in a field of anticipation. Vavuniya is a special case, yet what is at stake there is also a document that depends upon other documents, an iteration.

2. On the logic of the census, see Cohn's (1987) classic essay.

3. An activist human-rights group founded by Amara Hupuarachichi in the wake of several discussions surrounding the NIC is in the process of publicizing these contradictions in the media and challenging them before the Human Rights Commission and the supreme court, and through direct action. Malathi De Alwis and I are active members of this group.

4. This position is well known; perhaps Inden (1990) could be taken as a good example of it. My thoughts on essences owe much to David Scott's (1999:9) questions, even though my own critical direction may diverge from his.

5. My reading of both essays is indebted to Vivek Dhareshwar's engagement with them (see Dhareshwar 1995a, 1995b).

6. In an earlier work, I attempted to work through this contradiction by reading Marx's "The Jewish Question"; see Jeganathan (1994). I am now persuaded, given Balibar (1994:46), that Marx is incorrect on this point.

4

Deterritorialized Citizenship and the Resonances of the Sierra Leonean State

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The State...is a phenomenon of intraconsistency. It makes points resonate together...very diverse points of order, geographic, ethnic, linguistic, moral, economic, technological particularities.

—Deleuze and Guattari, in *A Thousand Plateaus*

Since the 1990s, political theorists of the state have had a field day in Africa—a continent that has been the setting for scholarship on the collapsed, privatized (Hibou 1999), criminalized (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1997), shadow (Reno 1995, 1998), and even forgerer state, or state as agent of deception *(l'état falsificateur).*[1] The more innovative contributions have sought to depathologize scholarly discourse on the state in Africa, by rethinking "corruption" within the framework of alternative political idioms, for instance (see Bayart 1981), and in the context of the historical legacy of colonialism in contemporary African politics (for example, Bayart 1993; Cooper 2002; Geschiere 1997; Mamdani 1996). In particular, the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone (and the flow of refugees they sent in flight toward neighboring countries, with destabilizing effects in the region) underscored the porousness of African border zones and brought to the fore the need to reflect on the state at its territorial margins. Liberia and Sierra Leone were referred to as "shadow states"—that is, states characterized by "the emergence of rulers drawing authority from their ability to control markets and their material rewards" (Reno 1995:3), especially through

the exploitation of precious resources. According to Reno, this control over wealth allowed the shadow state to disregard the absence of international recognition of its sovereignty and of other standard entanglements of legitimacy. Among other things, the shadow state could produce statelike enclaves in resource-rich parts of its territory, with their own regulatory practices. For example, Sierra Leone's Kono region, where the country's richest diamond veins are located, had its own security, licensing, and pass system to control the movements of a large and potentially restless population of young male diamond diggers—and this for well over two decades before the onset of the civil war. But as long as shadow states need to control natural and mineral resources that bring hard currency to survive, they also need to control the territorial enclaves where these resources are located. Whether the state controls these enclaves itself or temporarily cedes the right to do so to private businesses, it still exercises its prerogatives as an apparatus of capture that operates through specific places, and hence on the territory—the classic site or location of sovereignty. This is the case no matter how selectively this apparatus is activated in practice (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:432ff.).

Thus, even semiprivatized, semicriminal states achieve a measure of "integration"—in Deleuze and Guattari's terms—at least enough to produce what Timothy Mitchell has called a "state effect." One way a state effect is produced is by the drawing of boundaries, for instance, between state and society, or state and economy, urban and rural, in ways that make the state appear as an "inert 'structure' that somehow stands apart from individuals, precedes them, and contains and gives a framework to their lives" (Mitchell 1999:89). This is partly because the state is a "translocal" institution "made visible in localized practices" (Gupta 1995:376). In this chapter, I examine the relationship between two sets of practices that interpolate between local and translocal—even global—scales on which the resonances constitutive of a state effect are produced, with special reference to Sierra Leone. These are first some of the legal and administrative practices in which various states (including Sierra Leone) have engaged, having as their object Sierra Leonean citizens and their movements as migrants, travelers, and more recently war refugees. Among these practices are those of control over territory (including its delimitation with borders, their

policing, and so on) and populations (for instance, through the issuing of identity documents or restrictions over mobility).

But the bulk of the chapter situates such practices in the context of the experiences of Sierra Leoneans affected by them, and those who engage in border- and identity-making and -crossing practices of their own. These social actors, and their relationship to Sierra Leone and various host countries where I have encountered them, highlight ways in which forms of belonging characteristic of citizenship are deterritorialized, particularly through the figure of the immigrant and the war refugee. Broadly speaking, then, this chapter addresses problems in the biopolitical management of populations and territory, in this case specifically through the production of a social body—that is, counting, tracking, and identifying citizens with identity documents (see Foucault 1994:67–85)—as well as through control of flows of humans and goods at state borders. These practices have effects on citizen-subjects, who, in turn, shape the terms of this engagement in critical ways. Because this part of my analysis focuses on ways the state apparatus reterritorializes and works as a point of resonance beyond its borders, much of it deals with Sierra Leoneans outside their national territory.

ARBITRARINESS AND THE LAW

In what ways are the laws and workings of the (supra)state arbitrary? For one thing, they are experienced to be so by people who find themselves consistently disadvantaged by them: the law appears then as a well-guarded secret that exists to serve the interests of particular categories of people. There is also arbitrariness in the ways laws are applied—a problem not so much in the law itself as in its enforcement. But a further way in which the law and state rule are seen as arbitrary— one experienced by the Sierra Leoneans encountered in the course of my research—is that the state can arbitrate, decide, or create situations in which competing interests or interpretations of the common good obscure the threshold between legality and illegality. The antecedents for this arbitrariness are found in colonial rule, as others have pointed out (for example, Mamdani 1996; Mbembe 2001).

Under colonial rule in Sierra Leone, conflicting statutes setting the boundaries between the colony (ceded in 1807 to the British Crown by the Sierra Leone Company) and the protectorate (declared in 1896

over the adjoining hinterland—a much vaster territory) triggered flows of people and goods across internal border regions. Thus, rural people inhabiting neighboring villages separated by the invisible border between protectorate and colony experienced apparently arbitrary differences in treatment by the state's agents: on the protectorate side, taxation was announced in 1896, the same time foreign rule was established, and was enforced beginning in 1898 without exemptions; on the colony side, taxes were established a full century after the inception of colonial rule—later than in the protectorate—and with exemptions. The choice was clear for those wanting to avoid taxes. But it was in the domain of courts and the application of different bodies of law that ordinary people most felt the arbitrariness of jurisdictional boundaries, for in the colony they were subjects of the British Crown under English law, whereas in the protectorate they were subject to native courts and the oversight of summary justice meted out by the Frontier Police (Fyfe 1962:545). While under ordinary circumstances, people in the protectorate seeking legal redress felt that they could be better served by the colony courts, during the 1898 anticolonial "tax war," the situation was reversed. Of the 158 people convicted of murder after the rebellion was suppressed (Fyfe 1962:588–89), chiefs in the colony were hanged for treason as Crown subjects, whereas protectorate rulers were tried as external enemies and suffered a variety of punishments, including exile and imprisonment. Finally, the different treatment of slavery (legal in the protectorate until 1927, outlawed from 1787 on the colony's "British soil") produced the strategic back-and-forth movement of a population set in motion by all that this boundary implied.

Far from being ignored, the dividing line represented by the protectorate-colony border, and the differences in jurisdiction that came with it, gave rise to new meanings and uses. And these border practices were not circumscribed to rural inhabitants of the Sierra Leonean hinterland. The Frontier Police—and the composite colonial state on whose behalf they acted—invented their role as they went along. They had the vague mandate of keeping the peace in a vast territory while being explicitly forbidden to interfere with the rule of local chiefs and the courts. Police could not even protect citizens of the colony in the protectorate, because they were outside British jurisdiction. Often posted in small numbers to remote areas, far from the

supervision of their European superiors, members of this paramilitary body took on roles that ranged from standing by while local witch hunts produced dozens of casualties, to taking on abusive enforcement roles in stamping out domestic slavery and enforcing taxation (see Fyfe 1962:487, 506–07, 515). Furthermore, uncertainty about where the border between colony and protectorate lay periodically produced incidents that highlighted the social and political effects in practice of apparently abstract matters of law.

The twentieth century brought legal reforms that made British policies on either side of the border more consistent and eventually unified colony and protectorate under a single jurisdiction through a series of constitutional reforms initiated in 1951. But, to paraphrase Mitchell, the "border effect" of the British colonial state's policies in the area continues to resonate in internal divisions within postcolonial Sierra Leone. In this aspect, Sierra Leone appears to be a classic "bifurcated state" inherited from the "decentralized despotism" of colonial rule (Mamdani 1996), where on the one hand the colonial (and postcolonial) state exercised "customary" power, through native authorities, over tribalized peasant subjects in the rural hinterland—a hinterland that overlaps with the former protectorate. On the other hand the colony mostly overlapped with the Freetown peninsula and therefore corresponded to spaces where the colonial state held "civil" power over British subjects—urban-based citizens and non-Africans subject to modified forms of metropolitan law, and peasants subject to hybrid, intermediate jurisdictional forms. However, this would be a reductive, all too literalist reading of the state's territorializing power— its power to express in spatial terms specific forms of control—given the many ways in which the colonial state, however multiple and disorganized its practices, produced an effect of cohesion in the experience of its subjects.

In the extreme, colonial power exercised a form of absolute control over the body of the colonized, with its indiscriminate use of the "right to kill and make force prevail. Exercising command thus meant to compel people to perform 'obligations.' It also meant, as in an army, to proceed by orders and demands. *Commandement* itself was simultaneously a tone, an accoutrement, and an attitude" (Mbembe 2001:32). One could go further and say that the colonial state was "a *state*ment, an

ongoing assertion: it [gave] voice to an authoritative worldview, some-times backed by (open or concealed) displays of might" (Comaroff 1998:342), and in this capacity it was effective even when it lacked orga-nizational unity, when it appeared to sow the seeds of "collapsed" or "shadow" postcolonial states. In other words, I would tend to disagree with the "totalitarian" reading Mbembe gives of both the colonial and postcolonial successor states, given that one needs to take into account the distinction between "state effect"—including the phantasmatic constellation in which the state project is couched, thus projecting a totalizing image of itself—and the extent to which it may or may not be integrated at particular times and in particular sites.

Successor states held on to the absolute rights claimed by colonial rule, including the "right to kill," and exercised them often with the same impunity. The power of the postcolonial state in contemporary Sierra Leone manifested itself in the periodic declaration of emer-gency curfews, among other things. These were most recently justified by the government's provision of security in the context of the civil war and were accompanied by an escalation of abuses linked to "checking documents" (on the linkages between states of generalized insecurity, checkpoints, and the fetishism of documents, see also the chapters by Poole and Jeganathan in this volume). Under normal circumstances, blocking the movements of populations to inspect documents was linked to predictable sites and incidents (for example, the border crossing, the airport arrival lounge, the commission of an infraction), but under states of emergency, the sites of arbitrary blocks multiplied. Thus, as reported in Freetown's *The New Breed* (July 7–13, 1993), a soldier's demand that a citizen produce an identity card and pay a fine for leaving his house at night (during the curfew), even though he had left only to relieve himself in the outhouse in back, escalated into the citizen's death. I mention this example as a caricature of the rou-tinized, socialized character that the portrayal of the state's "absolute power" takes on in contexts in which it should not have to be invoked.

The prosecution of the soldier who committed this killing belies the fact that his gesture was far from illegal—it was authorized, as such gestures always are, under the emergency stipulations of the Sierra Leonean constitution. Furthermore, it belies the fact that, increasingly, such gestures are not only a feature of emergencies but are also

experienced in ordinary life, a feature of the commandement in post-colonial Africa (Mbembe 2001). In Sierra Leone and elsewhere, then, the arbitrariness at the heart of commandement became socialized—it became a feature of the popular and political imagination and an inseparable attribute of the state as an apparatus of capture and appro-priation. However, this arbitrariness was unable to hinder practices of mobility and self-fashioning among actors seeking, under different cir-cumstances, to redefine themselves according to alternative logics of belonging—whether religious or political or in relation to humanitar-ian discourse. It is paradoxically the latter, despite its refusal to be beholden to the logic of sovereign states, that has facilitated the search by Sierra Leoneans—migrants, refugees—for alternative citizenship options. This they have done by exploiting emergency measures taken elsewhere to protect them as "war refugees"—for instance, in countries to which they flee, where such "states of emergency" have been used to lift restrictions on immigration. Such practices highlight the limits *and* flexibility of citizenship in the new era of rights heralded by global humanitarianism.

Critiques of liberal-democratic models of the political (for example, Carl Schmitt) have underscored their weakness in failing to recognize that ultimately sovereignty is about the power to suspend the (ordi-nary) rule of law. Though in practice the decision on what constitutes an exception usually becomes relevant only in emergency situations, Schmitt saw it as a general concept in the theory of the state, to the extent that he redefined state sovereignty as being "not about the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide" (Schmitt [1922] 1988:5–13). Sovereignty is therefore always a border-line concept, one that must be legally circumscribed through provi-sions that grant only certain offices or bodies the right to decide upon—and hence declare—the exception, but it limits temporally the duration of states of emergency that are usually the pragmatic result of constitutional exceptions, without hampering them with particular laws. The decision is provided for in law, but at the moment of its exercise, it is not of the law—it must transcend the law as an included but external moment/provision of legality. The sovereign is the legally sanctioned outlaw.

Thus, the border between norm and exception, legality and illegality,

is precisely where, according to Schmitt, the ordinary business of sovereignty is transacted. One is not aware of the sovereign in ordinary circumstances, only in emergencies that call for a decision about exceptions. If a sovereign body is to remain legitimate—and Schmitt's critics hardly ever pay attention to the great care he paid to legitimacy—it must revert to the rule of law once the emergency is over. Ultimately, Schmitt was more interested in democratic forms of sovereignty than in totalitarian ones, but he saw the contradictions embedded in the weak models of sovereignty being developed by the liberal, parliamentary democratic regimes of Europe in the interwar period.

Schmitt's notion of the legality or illegality of the state can be tested at the various points of intersection along geographic borders where Sierra Leonean citizens and refugees clash with the law in the state's multiple resonances. Borders are sites for the territorial manifestation of state sovereignty in its classic sense: where practices of inclusion (of certain categories of citizens) or exclusion (of unwanted others) take place. But even where state authority is diminished, where sovereignty is in question and regulatory practices are not visibly displayed except in an arbitrary manner, encounters with borders still tell us much about the shifting contours of state *interests* in different subjects and territories. Indeed, the arbitrariness with which the state displays and imposes its interest in different bodies of subjects is compounded by the complicity of those very subjects, whose practices of self-fashioning produce unpredictable (and sometimes equally arbitrary) outcomes. For the effort to comply with arbitrary and capricious laws often produces unpredictable outcomes. This is true, too, when the arbitrariness is only apparent—in other words, when it is the product of opaque intentions and appears to protect the interests of the privileged few who are "above the law" or whose interests are best served by existing laws.

In his political writings, Foucault has shown the intimate links in modern Europe between the erection of state borders and the production of a social body through the control of populations. Indeed, he argued that in modern times there has been a "shift of accent" (Foucault 1994:67) from territorial states to states interested in regulating populations through ordinary and ubiquitous mechanisms that produce specific kinds of knowledge—the census; birth, marriage, and

death records—at the same time that they enable the delivery of services to populations. Foucault saw this modern form of power as producing biopolitical regimes where states control populations in increasingly intimate spheres of their bodily existence, to the point of producing new forms of subjectivity and even life.

On the face of it, biopolitical regimes appear very distant from Sierra Leone, which, with its neighbor Liberia, has had the distinction of being dubbed "the basket case of Africa" in matters ranging from the viability of the state to chances for a lasting peace after a decade of civil wars (see Moran and Pitcher 2003). The argument against the applicability of a biopolitical model to Sierra Leone is that the state as a regulatory and governing apparatus has failed to such a spectacular extent here that one can invoke neither governmentality nor older contractual, juridical models of sovereignty. Instead, I argue that a hybrid of these two models applies to postcolonial states like Sierra Leone and, more generally, that postcolonial Sierra Leone's political subjects are more at home in the "control" models of the state espoused by Deleuze and Guattari—who see the state as an apparatus of capture, integrated more as a network than an organism—than in the purely biopolitical ones spawned by partial readings of Foucault. Postcolonial states like Sierra Leone work more according to the logic of code than life-forms, discontinuity and resonances than organisms, and as such are fundamentally at odds with the supposedly organic models of the biopolitical. The modal form of relatedness in a digital system is the network, within which the state can carve out an area of control without compromising the whole system, as opposed to the interdependent integration of (pre- or post-genomic) organisms and their component parts (see Riles 2000).

Paradoxically, the biopolitical administration of life and over the living, and the incompleteness of its projects, paves the way to different constructs of the national or supranational subject-citizen. Sierra Leoneans with whom I have worked, in and outside their country, are subject to discontinuous forms of state and supranational interventions, which, while apparently random and arbitrary, make up an experience that as a whole reinforces their "being Sierra Leonean"—constituting resonances that might produce a sense of shared nationality when they find themselves elsewhere. As I show below, this

reinforcement of a national identity is not bound up with clearly marked territorial boundaries but rather with a lingering, deterritorialized fetishism of the origin, of belonging. Thus, for example, one can have the paradox of Mohammed, a Sierra Leonean I met in Egypt in 1993 and who eight years later was admitted into the United States as a "war refugee," thanks to the intervention of a humanitarian organization—even though he had not lived in Sierra Leone since 1961, let alone directly experienced the upheavals of the 1991–2002 civil war. Indeed, his transformation over the years into a devout Muslim whose main community of belonging was based on religion had been so thorough that he had even shed his original name. This situation points to another "layer" in the integration of the state, for in the post–civil war context, it is the global humanitarian apparatus that often intervenes with statelike forms of governmentality—producing demographic data on populations, issuing identity documents, delivering health care and other services—that reconstitute a deterritorialized Sierra Leone through the assemblage of the country's refugees and migrants.

The emergent figure of the refugee in contemporary political debates—replacing the traditional "citizen" attached to the land by blood and territoriality and, in the process, representing "the extreme phase of the separation of the rights of man from the rights of the citizen" (Agamben 1998:133)—raises crucial questions about the juridical implications of deterritorialization. People become refugees at territorial borders between states (otherwise, humanitarian organizations classify them as IDPs—internally displaced persons—a category predicated on other kinds of intrastate boundaries). And it is often at the border that exceptions to the rule of inclusion/exclusion that necessarily define the limits of citizenship are made. Additionally, refugees in humanitarian camps raise the question of territoriality and boundaries in ways that highlight the "borderline" nature of sovereignty as the decision about the exception, for it is under the conditional, temporally bounded, and regulated vigilance of a sovereign state that a territory within it can be created—a territory over which the state shares control with, say, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or other humanitarian organizations (see Malkki 1995:38). Thus, the refugee is the negative image through which new modes of citizenship can be perceived (and, too, a new generation of rights linked to them),

and the border, both conceptual and territorial, is a privileged site for eliciting certain kinds of legal practices.

Refugees experience in practice the exclusionary nature of state sovereignty in relation to the state from which they have fled but also in relation to the host state, where they are treated as barely included exceptions without citizenship rights (see Malkki 1995:162–64). Furthermore, a neglected aspect of the forms of exclusion set in motion by violence and warfare is their impact on host populations. Refugees confront citizens with the limits of their own rights and sometimes become catalysts for processes of nation building among their hosts. The exclusions included in the normal exercise of state sovereignty are highlighted by the presence of refugees in part because states often contain them in camps near territorial borders, as was the case with large camps for Liberian and Sierra Leonean war refugees in the "Parrot's Beak" region, where the two countries and Guinea join borders (see Henry 2000:87, 2002). Among other reasons, states choose these locations to isolate the potential logistical and other problems represented by refugees and sometimes to channel the international humanitarian resources that normally concentrate around refugee camps into underdeveloped frontier zones, where host states have an interest in better controlling their own citizens and interests. Thus, Liisa Malkki points to the Tanzanian government decision to locate a major camp for Hutu refugees of the 1972 Burundian civil war in an uninhabited, "forbidding" region in order to use refugee labor to develop the area for agricultural use. The refugees understood that their role in the area was to develop the frontier (Malkki 1995:40–44, 121–24). In some cases, this process produces situations in which refugees interact with citizens of a foreign state, and familiarity is established rapidly because of shared histories, languages, and cultures—as with refugees from the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars in Guinean camps—but new tensions arise because their presence highlights the marginality of host populations within their own countries.

That the flight of refugees from Sierra Leone can be, as Mohammed's case suggests, more the product of imagination than historical fact is precisely part of the argument here: postcolonial Sierra Leone as a state is first and foremost a state of the imagination—albeit one that has "real" effects such as points of legal decision, coercion,

rights of life and death, and so on. This is especially true of post–civil war Sierra Leone, where international media and humanitarian interventions have projected on a global stage this particular state's "resonances." Since its inception in 1991, the civil war in Sierra Leone has been notable first for its invisibility on the global scene, and from 1996 on, for the attention paid by the international media and humanitarian organizations to the youthfulness of the perpetrators of violence, the mutilated bodies of their victims, and the role of global diamond and criminal interests in the prolongation of the war. These images have helped propel Sierra Leone to the top of the charts of humanitarian interventions, to the extent that despite its relatively small size and population (fewer than five million inhabitants), it has been the theater of the largest deployment of UN peacekeepers anywhere in the world (more than 17,000 troops), has the highest concentration of NGOs, and has seen an investment of funds by the global humanitarian apparatus that dwarfs the country's gross national product (see Ferme and Hoffman 2002:27–28).

This major exercise in humanitarian intervention and international aid has not merely supported the state apparatus: it has become a key point of integration of the state, resonating from the global to the local level. In the process, these interventions have become factors in the very processes of destabilization they seek to ameliorate, while producing more "points of resonance." For instance, donors or lending agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF make aid to African states conditional upon human-rights reforms in ways that manage to undermine the old system of legitimation, but without monitoring the thorough implementation of reforms. Thus, the old is destroyed, but the new political forces that may emerge in its place are never given a chance to become strong enough to subvert corrupt regimes (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1997:19). These interventions have contributed to the loss of central power in African states and to their privatization—the contraction or redeployment of state sovereignty in many parts of Africa (Hibou 1999), perhaps even altogether privatized sovereignty, through forms of "private, indirect government" that prolong by new means colonial forms of rule (Mbembe 2001:80–85). Such perspectives on the postcolonial African state rightly link the privatization of the state to the increasing involvement of larger and larger parts of the

state apparatus in criminal activities that have brutal effects on the populations inhabiting particular territories.[2] In Sierra Leone, complicities among state actors acting for private gain and global business interests, especially around precious mineral resources, have been at work mostly in diamond-producing areas, which in wartime were placed under the effective control of private security firms acting in lieu of the state (see Reno 1997a, 1997b). However, since the 1990s, privatization has taken on positive connotations too, with PPPs, "public-private partnerships" among states and business interests, becoming key discursive and pragmatic vehicles for development policymaking in Africa. Their main institutional framework is NEPAD, the New Partnership for African Development, a body whose neoliberal premises are exposed by the eclectic mix of private enterprises, states, NGOs, and international humanitarian organizations that have chosen to channel through it activities ranging from business investments to development aid.

Humanitarian organizations' practices of registration—in wartime and postwar settings—of multitudes of refugees, internally displaced people, combatants, and civilians, in order to identify those in need of development, health aid, and food relief, fall within the biopolitical order within which so-called failed states do not operate consistently. In Sierra Leone, then, supranational mechanisms for regulating populations succeeded where the state failed. For example, a range of registration, counting, and identification exercises took place after January 2002, when the war was declared officially over, so most Sierra Leoneans have acquired multiple identification documents and registrations in overlapping exercises of "hyper-identification": preparations for the first postwar national census; the drawing up of voter lists for the May 2002 national ballot; the drawing up of lists of chiefdom electors for the 2002–2003 chiefdom elections; DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) programs; and so on. Everyone has multiple IDs, each entitling the holder to something different, and each corresponding to a name on a different agency's list.

And yet the Sierra Leonean state has not been entirely unsuccessful in its practices of governmentality, especially in regulating fiscal behaviors that others have identified among the key "boundary-marking" practices of the state (Roitman 1998). Thus, for most of the decade leading up to the civil war, the "SAPped" (Structural

Adjustment Program–debilitated) 1980s, when the Sierra Leonean state's ability to deliver services or health care, or even to carry out a census, had deteriorated so much that the state could only engage in such practices when they were mostly organized and bankrolled by international agencies (for example, the UN-sponsored 1985 population census), taxes, fines, and fees were collected with impressive regularity in rural areas. Indeed, well into the 1990s, the annual tax receipt was the only identity document valid for travel within the country issued with any regularity, as one national identification scheme after another failed or was not implemented. The receipt vouched for a man's identity and residence (it documented a tax on "adult heads of households"—generally male). It included the man's name and village/chiefdom of residence, along with the amount paid and the signature of the chief collecting the tax. Since the receipt could be issued only by a chief or his representative, it amounted to an endorsement by the local authorities that the bearer was a person in good standing in the area. As such, the tax receipt and the fiscal practices it stood for acted precisely as one of the "local" points of resonance that made fiscal governmentality an aspect of the overall "state effect."[3] Though this scheme, too, failed to achieve full compliance—and left open the issue of how to keep track of people who were not required to pay taxes, such as the young, old, and female dependents of those (mostly male) "household heads"—men who did not have their tax receipts did not dare travel the "failed" Sierra Leonean state's main roads for fear of running into harassment by the police at checkpoints.

In the section that follows, I turn to a more detailed analysis of precisely this aspect of the "state effect," namely, the ways in which individual Sierra Leoneans (in this case those living in the diaspora) have refashioned their sense of belonging to the Sierra Leone nation-state in their encounters with the deterritorialized arena of international legal and humanitarian intervention, sometimes exploiting it in unpredictable manners.

REFUGEES, MIGRANTS, AND THE LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP

When I met him in Cairo in 1993, the "elder" of the resident Sierra Leonean community, Mohammed Mussa Ibrahim (not his real name),

had no prospects of immigrating to America, even though he had taught himself English to improve his employment prospects in a country that was suffering serious economic setbacks as a result of the 1991 Gulf War. The war-linked exodus of expatriate workers from Persian Gulf states—and the related decline in remittances—had significantly affected the livelihoods of many Arab-speaking Africans in Cairo, whose seasonal employment in the oil-fueled gulf economies supported their semilegal existence in Egypt. As noncitizens, they could not legally work in Cairo, and though the particular group I got to know had originally entered the country as scholarship students at al-Azhar University—one of the eminent institutions of higher learning in the Muslim world—their scholarships had long since ceased to be adequate to support them.[4] Thus, Mohammed joined a growing number of noncitizen West Africans who lived in precarious conditions—having ceased to be al-Azhar students, either because they had graduated or had been forced to drop out to support themselves, and yet not being able to find adequate employment to move on and leave the country. Their movements were circumscribed too, because with respect to their earlier lives as fully registered students with official papers, travel out of the country now could very well leave them stranded and unable to legally reenter. For Sierra Leonean students in particular, the absence of any diplomatic representation in Cairo presented a further problem, making them dependent on the mail, or on increasingly rare visits by staff from the embassy in Saudi Arabia (in 1993, no one had come for more than two years). Finally, the fact that many in Mohammed's older generation were men who had arrived alone, and had married Egyptian women and had families, was an indication of crucial gendered and generational dimensions of this precarious existence at the margins of legal and political citizenship. In Egypt as elsewhere, paternity determines citizenship, so Sierra Leonean men have no hope of becoming citizens or passing their citizenship on to their Egyptian-Sierra Leonean offspring.

Hence the paradox of the case of Sheku, a Sierra Leonean whose mixed parentage created a rather different citizenship conundrum than did Mohammed's. Sheku was born in Cairo of an Egyptian mother and a Sierra Leonean father and grew up both in Egypt and in Sierra Leone. When we met, he was a cosmopolitan and well-educated

student in the first year of a health administration master's program at the American University of Cairo (AUC). He had paid for his much more expensive private education at this international English-language university with money earned on a summer job as a translator in the Arabic department of Christie's auction house in London and with odd white-collar jobs taken during school holidays in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Yet, as a noncitizen (because his Egyptian birth and Arabic mother tongue were products of maternity rather than paternity), Sheku, too, could rely only on his active enrollment status as a student to get the proper papers needed to travel out of the country.

The much younger Sheku (he was twenty-seven years old when we met in Cairo) had already decided that he wanted to go to America. Born in Egypt, educated in Sierra Leone between the ages of eight and twenty, then flown back to Cairo to attend university, Sheku had come somewhat closer to his American dream after leaving Cairo University, where he had begun his studies, and enrolling instead at AUC. By contrast, Mohammed was about fifty, and in many ways he represented a different Sierra Leonean generation. He had arrived in Cairo in his late teens or early twenties with virtually no formal schooling, and his heavily accented Arabic was the only international language he spoke. He had left Sierra Leone in 1961, only a few weeks after the country had become independent of British colonial rule, and had traveled three years overland before arriving in Egypt—a country he remembered leaving only to go on pilgrimage to Mecca. Yet both these men had to become "Sierra Leonean war refugees" before they were able to move to the United States under the auspices of humanitarian NGOs devoted to supporting refugees.

During the second half of the 1990s, the international humanitarian mobilization triggered by the civil war enhanced the prospects of Sierra Leoneans emigrating to diasporic communities in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. Sheku, Mohammed, and other Sierra Leoneans in Egypt were part of the deterritorialized "resonances" that suddenly made their putative origins in an African state at war a ticket to their American dreams. The fact that for Sheku, born in Egypt, and Mohammed, born in Sierra Leone, the fetish of territorial origins still operative in the international order of things worked along the axes of paternity and birth respectively underscores the multiple ways in which

the articulation of blood, birth, and territory works to deterritorialize and reterritorialize the state. Always the lucky one, Sheku arrived in the United States in 1999, having won one of 55,000 Diversity Immigrant Visas granted through an annual lottery according to an utterly American logic of the gift, "profitlessness," and excess, which Bataille (1989: esp. vol. 1, pt. 1; vol. 3) so perceptively linked to true sovereignty. Sheku was issued an Alien Registration Receipt Card, also known as a "green card," which official US government Web sites helpfully describe as no longer green but pink with blue security marks. Note that for the United States too—as for the Sierra Leonean state—the link is made between fiscal matters and the incorporation of potential citizens: the green card is a "receipt." Thanks to his lottery luck, Sheku might not have to live for years in vulnerable states of illegality or legality limited by partial rights, as was the case with Mohammed and many other Sierra Leoneans I met in the United States. Thus, if the modality of the postcolonial African state is an arbitrariness of rule inherited from its colonial antecedents—as Mbembe argues—the modality of other empire-states can also be the decision to leave the matter of citizenship for some limited number of applicants to the randomness of luck and the lottery. For Sierra Leoneans like Mohammed, a green card will be found at the end of the ordinary, more circuitous and time-consuming, bureaucratic channels.

Empires new and old have sometimes delegated the most recent arrivals into their territories to policing borders and ports of entry, so in some ways Mohammed's first job in America, as a refugee screening travelers in the Phoenix, Arizona, airport, was only the most recent version of an ancient strategy. What has made more marked the paradox of a person without the right to permanently reside in a country—let alone rights of citizenship—providing a form of "border security" is that in the age of air travel, this task has moved from distant land frontiers or ports at the edge of the sea to the heart of our cities. International airport employees in Mohammed's precarious position with respect to citizenship and employment work to screen others in very similar positions to their own—people whose fates are different only because of aspects of their documentation. These make the difference between being able to reside in a country and find employment there—if only at half the hourly pay of better-educated citizens, as was

the fate of Mohammed after the 9/11 tightening of security regulations that cost him his airport screening job. Others never step on the state's sovereign territory to enjoy more or less of the benefits of citizenship. Instead, they remain trapped in the *zones d'attente*—the airport buildings and rooms where asylum seekers, refugees, and other "aliens" with irregular documentation remain without rights while waiting for decisions to be made on their fates. In these places, they sometimes feel the state's policing force without the mitigating restraint of the law. For example, in early 2003, ZAPI 3, one of Charles de Gaulle International Airport's several *zones d'attente pour personnes en instance* (ZAPIs, waiting areas for persons with pending applications and judgments), came under inquest and public scrutiny for episodes of police brutality against foreigners (Zappi 2003; see also Agamben 1998:175).

But Mohammed's short-lived employment in the airport security business was only one of the ironies of his predicament. Another was that, as mentioned earlier, although he arrived in the United States under dispensations granted to refugees of the Sierra Leonean civil war, Mohammed had not resided in Sierra Leone for some forty years. Nonetheless, his American journey was made possible because for several years the US attorney general had designated Sierra Leonean citizens as having the right to "temporary protected status," or TPS.[5] TPS grants to nationals of specific states—or aliens with "no nationality" residing in the United States who last resided in those states—permission to regularize their positions and hence legally reside or work in the United States. A special emergency provision explicitly targets those "in nonimmigrant and unlawful status" (Department of Justice 1997:59736–37), including those whose applications for refugee status have already been denied by the US government. Like all emergency procedures, then, TPS designation suspends laws that would ordinarily apply to Sierra Leoneans who want to enter and remain in the United States, and as long as it is renewed, it grants them (and people from other designated countries) the right to remain and work in the country regardless of the conditions under which they entered.

However, it takes more than laws to facilitate the movement of multitudes reclassified as "refugees" (always individualized as "special cases") or exceptions by humanitarian discourse (always carefully counted in annual TPS extension documents). In 1997, when TPS

began, a maximum of 4,000 "nationals of Sierra Leone (and aliens having no nationality who last habitually resided in Sierra Leone)" were estimated to be "in nonimmigrant or unlawful status and therefore eligible for Temporary Protected Status" in the United States (Department of Justice 1997), but by 2002 that figure had been reduced to an estimated 2,209 eligible individuals (NILC 2002). Here again the logic of deterritorialization intrudes, for to those Sierra Leoneans who still need to go through the regular channels and apply for a visa to enter the United States from their own country, other obstacles loom large. At several points during the civil war, and continuing in its aftermath, there were no routine American consular services in Sierra Leone (and sometimes no US diplomatic representation at all). Sierra Leoneans seeking visas to travel to the United States must first find their way to Abidjan in Côte d'Ivoire. As the Freetown press routinely points out, this situation excludes all but the wealthiest and most cosmopolitan (internationally connected) Sierra Leonean citizens from attempting to enter the United States legally, as they must risk wasting the airfare and costs of staying in Abidjan while their visa applications are processed without the certainty of success—a different kind of lottery and risk from those resulting in Sheku's green card, which also underscores the fact that in practice there are obstacles to mobility other than legal proscriptions.

Nor is the international traffic in visas and the desire to immigrate a one-way street from poorer to wealthier countries. During the latter part of the civil war, Solomon Musa, the head of the Sierra Leonean immigration service, was imprisoned in a Hong Kong jail. Freetown's *Progress* newspaper reported on August 27, 1999, that he was "still languishing [there] for the illegal sales of Sierra Leonean diplomatic passports to Hong Kong citizens." The desirability of passports from a small African country mired in civil war for wealthy Asians may be difficult to understand, even as an extreme manifestation of the "weakness for foreign passports" among Hong Kong businessmen on the eve of the colony's 1997 transition from British rule to reunification with mainland China (see Ong 1999b:1). Uncertainties about the potential hazards of the transition from British rule—under which capitalist accumulation and labor circulation were relatively unfettered by government intervention—to one of the last "actually existing" socialist

regimes may have made Hong Kong elites rather unselective about their pursuit of multiple citizenships. Perhaps, too, Hong Kong businessmen were aware of the economic opportunities offered by the exploitation of Sierra Leonean natural and mineral resources. However, it would be a mistake to see this passport story linking a Sierra Leonean immigration official seeking private gain and Hong Kong businessmen in search of double citizenships as merely an ironic, fateful coincidence in the order of things in the age of globalization, for both sides of this encounter are linked by their unsettled locations at the opposite spatiotemporal extremes of a single British Empire.

Indeed, it was the interpolation of these edges of empire with another "empire," the United States, that shaped the improbable alliance between wealthy Hong Kong citizens and Sierra Leonean immigration officials. For despite his own immobilization in a Chinese jail, Mr. Musa's activities were embedded within a transnational project of his own, one not unlike those of the more mobile Chinese citizens, who brought about his downfall. Indeed, proceeds from the sale of diplomatic passports financed the comfortable relocation of his wife and children to the United States—a relocation facilitated by the US government designation of Sierra Leoneans under TPS. Furthermore, even though in this case a state agent acted illegally to grant documents to people who were not entitled to them, just as often the dynamics were reversed, and citizens found themselves dispossessed by the arbitrary withdrawal of their rights and documents by state agents, or they manipulated their paperwork to circumvent these agents in the pursuit of traveling papers.[6]

So far, the different circumstances under which Mohammed and Sheku entered the United States from Cairo as "Sierra Leonean refugees" have highlighted some of the ways in which the Sierra Leonean state is territorialized even under deterritorialized conditions, for it can cast its shadow onto American soil through the assemblages of its refugees, who as deterritorialized lines of flight (quite literally in flight from Sierra Leone) nonetheless undergo "all kinds of reterritorializations and redundancies—redundancies of childhood, village-life, love, bureaucracy, etc." (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:89). At the same time, this process can produce deterritorialized vectors of belonging to the nation-state, so as refugees in America, Sheku and Mohammed

perhaps are now more "Sierra Leonean" than they were in Cairo—at least according to official state documentation. In the process, American officials have sometimes unwittingly engaged in practices that have magnified previous bureaucratic errors and forgeries to change the identities they have been so careful to document. Thus, I mentioned earlier that I could only guess Mohammed's age to be around fifty when we met in Cairo. I did so after the fact because when I met him bearing an unfamiliar name but a very familiar face, I discovered that he was a close relative of my first Mende language teacher, a fellow graduate student in the United States, and one of my closest Sierra Leonean friends—a Freetown nurse who had moved to London before the civil war. Mohammed had left Sierra Leone as Jusu L., but on the way he had taken on the name of a Nigerian patron who had inspired him and his two traveling companions to go to Cairo for a higher religious education at al-Azhar University. This patron also found them work to finance the trip ahead and, more importantly, made arrangements for Jusu and friends to have a scholarship at al-Azhar waiting for them once they arrived in Cairo.

For many years, I had known Mohammed's father and siblings in rural Sierra Leone. When I returned there after my visit to Cairo and told them I had met him and reconstituted their side of his story, it became clear that he was born well before 1949, the birth date he gave me. But this was the only birth date Mohammed knew, and when I had expressed doubts about his age, he had provided as supporting evidence an expired Sierra Leonean passport. In addition to the 1949 birth date, the passport gave Mohammed's "newer" name, although, as we shall see below, the transition from his birth name—listed on the passport with which he had left Sierra Leone—to his new identity was not as unproblematic as changing his birth date. Each document legitimized the issuing of successor documents, so erroneous initial information (the date of birth) or changed information (the name) was reproduced or magnified. By the time Mohammed arrived in the United States with only Red Cross "refugee" papers, the need to reconstitute his birth certificate so that he could apply for a green card had moved the name Mohammed, a name acquired as an adult in an act of religious conversion and loyalty, back in time to his birth. Thus, the question of Mohammed's Sierra Leonean provenance and his status as

an "alien having no nationality who last resided in Sierra Leone" were deceptively clarified and fixed in new documents by the humanitarian organization that brought him to the United States, and thereafter by American authorities in the process of issuing him a new birth certificate. In the process, his (changed) name was also inextricably linked to his (wrong) birth date in a falsified document of birth and origins. L'état falsificateur, the state as agent of deception, indeed!

As Jusu/Mohammed told the story of his journey out of Sierra Leone, his name change was a gesture of gratitude toward the Nigerian man who had given spiritual direction to a trip that had begun as an impulse to see the world. But from that encounter onward, it became a focused quest for a Muslim religious education and for the concrete means to attain it. His account was essentially a narrative of conversion, and his name change was a natural way of signaling the profound transformation he experienced. But the circumstances under which Mohammed's generous patron had traveled to Sierra Leone in the first place, and the circumstances of Mohammed's visit to him, bespoke a pattern of mobility not only linked to the religious imagination and to historical Muslim networks such as those of the Tijaniyya Sufi order to which both of them belonged. It also was a mobility made possible by the fact that their respective homelands in northern Nigeria and southern Sierra Leone were linked by their common belonging to the British imperial political economy, despite the distance separating them. Within this empire, people like Mohammed's patron were set in motion from far-flung corners by colonial policies "discriminating against indigenous entrepreneurs" in Sierra Leonean diamond mining in order to undermine potential internal challenges to the state's authority over resource-rich areas (Reno 1995:50).

At the border crossing between Chad and Sudan on the main road toward el-Obeid (Sudan), Mohammed and his fellow travelers were stopped on grounds that they were "too young" to travel on their own. This was a significant and highly charged border crossing—one situated on the overlapping topographies of ancient land routes taken by West African Muslims on the pilgrimage to Mecca and the political economy of the postcolonial Sudanese state and the massive, intensive cotton-growing scheme inherited from its colonial predecessor. The Gezira Scheme required large labor inputs, and "the largest farm in the

world under one single management" (Yamba 1995:68ff.) gradually came to shape the Sudanese colonial and postcolonial state's efforts to control for this purpose the multitude of West African pilgrims passing through on land routes to Mecca. It was this latter dimension—the state's opportunistic policing of potential labor traffic over the border, reducing entries when the scheme was doing poorly while trying to entice migrants to settle under better circumstances—that probably resulted in Mohammed's exclusion on grounds that he and his companions were "too young" for unaccompanied travel. Eventually Mohammed managed to illegally cross the border with the support of a Chadian Muslim who was moved by the story of his quest for an al-Azhar education.

When Mohammed went to the Egyptian embassy in Khartoum to get a visa for his trip to Cairo, "history" caught up with him. Up to that point, he had managed to travel across the newly independent states of West Africa while still enjoying to some extent the mobility that had been possible in the large territorial expanses of colonial empires with variable interests in policing their internal borders. Often these policing efforts were linked to particular fiscal or labor needs (as in the case of colony-protectorate borders in Sierra Leone discussed earlier, and in the Sudanese case). But in Khartoum, Mohammed encountered a different instantiation of the Sierra Leonean state within terms still framed by its former colonial ruler. The Egyptian embassy informed Mohammed that his British passport was no longer valid, and he was directed to the British embassy to have a new one issued. At the British embassy, the three-year "British Commonwealth" passport that Mohammed had been issued in Sierra Leone was declared invalid, and he was given one week to secure new identity papers and a passport from Sierra Leone. In issuing this direction, the British embassy in Khartoum—and the Sierra Leonean state it represented in the absence of its own diplomatic mission—placed Mohammed in a vulnerable position on the margins of legality, with only one week to regularize his position.

The British Nationality Act (1948), under which Mohammed's first passport had been issued, had granted him in theory easy access to other Commonwealth countries under colonial policies that saw in such movement the key to economic prosperity in the imperial economy (see Mukwaya 1997:4). Indeed, diamond mining in Sierra

Leone and cotton farming in the Sudan were among the projects that benefited from such population movements, as we have seen. But with the independence of many African colonies from the mid-1950s onward and the "darkening" skin hues of what once was known as "the White Commonwealth," on the one hand Britain began to enact increasingly restrictive legislation to control access to its own territory by former colonial subjects, and on the other hand the new nation-states began to regulate their borders with their own immigration laws. Some of these laws were directly triggered by the weakening reciprocity in Britain's policy toward Commonwealth citizens and the former colonial power's increasingly selective approach to granting citizenship rights. For example, the 1948 Nationality Act and 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act specified that British subjects in newly independent states who found themselves excluded by new citizenship laws had the option of remaining British. This provision, under the guise of protecting them from becoming "stateless," gave communities such as white settlers or Asians in African states the privilege of retaining UK citizenship. The other side of this provision was that in the process of decolonization these communities had more options when it came to citizenship than did people of African descent, who because of their race (disguised in language about birth and descent) were turned automatically into citizens of the newly independent states without any choice in the matter (see Mukwaya 1997 for a discussion of the Ugandan "Asian question" from this perspective). The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 also made the issuing of Commonwealth documents valid for travel to the United Kingdom conditional upon applying for selectively issued work vouchers. Later immigration laws introduced distinctions between "patrial" and "non-patrial" British subjects—to distinguish those with a parent or grandparent born in the United Kingdom from those (mostly nonwhites) who could not meet this requirement—that justified granting *partial* citizenship rights to some and rather fuller ones to others (see Hope 1997).

Mohammed unwittingly got caught in the changes enacted by the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act and its radical restriction on his movements as a Sierra Leonean national. Some thirty years later, when he told me his story in Cairo, one could still hear his surprise at the arbitrariness he perceived in the way in which his passport's validity and

the rights it secured him were altered. His "British" passport, which was supposed to have a three-year validity, was taken by an embassy bureaucrat, who without a word shortened it to one week "because Sierra Leone is now independent, and you can no longer have a British passport. So you have one week to get yourself the proper passport. And there was no Sierra Leone diplomatic mission there." Because of the difficulties involved in securing the proper documentation by mail from Freetown and London, the need to earn money for this process and the rest of their journey, and complications linked to the fact that Mohammed wanted his new passport issued in his new name, he and his two friends ended up remaining in Khartoum for more than nine months. He recognized that the problems linked to his name change were of his own making, so he did not resent the delays this caused. But he experienced the reduction within a few seconds of a vital document with a three-year validity to a temporary, one-week paper as an arbitrary act. He had taken his original passport to be guaranteed by the laws in force at the time it was issued. He assumed that any changes in policy would not affect already existing documents and considered that ex post facto invalidation to be arbitrary and unjust.

The former colonial state's unilateral suspension of rights and documents and its exclusionary practices produced illegalities beyond its borders by transforming a citizen of the British Commonwealth with a valid traveling document into a stateless person. The exclusionary practices that accompany even more ordinary transactions between states and citizens were exacerbated by the transitional nature of the very questions of national belonging on which Mohammed's identity documents depended in the shift from colonialism to independence. In order to get new passports and earn enough money to continue their journey, Mohammed and his friends waited for nine months and two weeks, while the correspondence, forms, money, and photographs circulated among London, Freetown, and Khartoum. One factor lengthening the wait was the absence of a developed infrastructure for diplomatic representation for the newly independent Sierra Leonean state and its reliance on the embassy of its former colonial ruler. Another factor was the ambiguous legal status of Mohammed's new name. He and his friends experienced, as a loss of time carefully measured in its passing (nine months and two weeks), their impotence in

the face of bureaucratic powers and the international order of things and their reduction to an illegal status (their criminalization) as a result of the Sudanese, British, and Sierra Leonean states' doings.

By the time Mohammed finally reached Cairo in 1964, his change of identity became once again a stumbling block. The documents that he had so carefully carried from Nigeria to ensure that he would be awarded a scholarship became an impediment in that direction, since they were issued in his birth name, a name that no longer appeared in his (new) passport. This situation caused a further six-month delay in his receipt of the scholarship that would allow him to begin his studies, although he was able to prove with his earlier passport in hand that he was the same person with a different name in his new document. Mohammed's delays were partly linked to historical contingencies in the wider world (the changing international order of the 1960s, available travel and communication technology in Africa, and so forth), partly to changes in his own identity, and partly to educational and other socioeconomic circumstances that prevented him from traveling faster.

As Sheku's contrasting story makes clear, there were marked generational differences in the experiences of other West Africans in the diaspora who made their way to Cairo as migrants, refugees, or business travelers. Mohammed stood for the almost classic figure of the young person moved to travel by wanderlust, and taking his time to gain experiences along the way, only to undergo a life-transforming religious conversion on the road, which then gave his movements a specific goal. His narrative did not dwell on the bureaucratic mishaps or delays that he and his traveling companions encountered while covering the considerable land distance (and several border crossings) between Sierra Leone and Nigeria. It was only *after* his encounter in northern Nigeria with the patron whose name he now carries, after his religious reawakening gave him the urge to do something with himself and acquire a "proper" advanced education that would give him the necessary fluency in Arabic to read advanced religious and philosophical texts in the Islamic tradition, that the temporal impediments to his journey and the very detailed accounting for wasted time loomed large in his narrative. By then he was in a hurry to get where he was going, so his account of document mishaps in Chad, Sudan, and Egypt were

peppered with expressions such as "We started the paperwork to apply for a new passport...in order to get through all this it took us nine months and two weeks. Nine months and two weeks in Khartoum" and "But in Cairo I encountered another problem.... So it took me six months to get a scholarship once I cleared up the business of my name. I showed them the old passport, it is Jusu L., the new one, it is Mohammed Mussa Ibrahim, both are the same person, I changed names." In Mohammed's account of his encounters with border guards and other state authorities, his feeling of powerlessness in front of the agents of the state was always expressed as a conflict of spatiotemporalities, as an excessive amount of time spent in a particular (other) state or space, rooted in immobility for a long time, his mobility disrupted because of yet another problem arising with his passport.

By contrast, Sheku, the binational son of a mixed marriage, apparently at home in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, even though in the end just as foreign and displaced in Egypt as Mohammed was, gave a very different account. He, too, ran into "roadblocks" put up by the Egyptian government to favor its own citizens. He had wanted to study medicine, an elite subject requiring entrance examinations, at Cairo University. Because the bulk of his schooling had been in Sierra Leone, he was not allowed to enroll without doing a preparatory year. Even when he placed first in his class in the final exams, he still was denied a scholarship to medical school. While waiting for something to clear the impasse, he decided to take advantage of an opportunity to perform the Umra (a minor pilgrimage to the holy places in Saudi Arabia). While there, he stayed on a few months to meet up with his grandfather, who was coming from Sierra Leone for the hajj. His family had political connections with the government in Sierra Leone (his uncle was a minister), and his grandfather introduced him to another minister on hajj with him. Through the minister's influence with the Egyptian ambassador to Sierra Leone, Sheku managed upon his return to Cairo to find a scholarship to go to medical school.

Thus, through the deterritorialized displacements of Sierra Leonean–Egyptian diplomatic, religious, and business interests, and the political and family connections among Sierra Leoneans at home and abroad intersecting in Saudi Arabia, the matter of Sheku's university scholarship and "foreign" status was solved—at least temporarily.

His privileged socioeconomic background in Sierra Leone was a key factor, pointing to yet another aspect of the workings of the state's territorializing tendency, namely, its role in the reproduction of class differences and the difference class makes in access to the rights of citizenship. These differences are, in turn, key elements in unequal access to educational opportunities and the mobility to which such education gives access. Thus, while Sheku's flawless standard Arabic and English and his family connections in the United Kingdom gave him access to a legal, well-paying summer job at Christie's in London, Mohammed worked illegally as a "foreigner" without working clearance in Cairo, giving remedial private lessons to schoolchildren at home. But the outcomes of their encounters with state bureaucrats and agents were not always radically different: after two years at Cairo University, Sheku's scholarship was abruptly terminated due to a technicality, and he found his university studies interrupted for three years. Like Mohammed and so many others when they encountered the legal and bureaucratic apparatus of the state, Sheku came up against the arbitrary reduction of the duration of a document—in this case, the Egyptian government document granting him a fellowship.

With the assistance of his Egyptian mother and another very good summer job, he was able to save enough money for tuition at the American University in Cairo—where his foreign status made no difference as long as he could cover the fees—and came closer to his dream of moving to America. But for him too, it was ultimately the random lottery and the designation "Sierra Leonean refugee" that had to intervene to transform the fantasy into a landing on American soil.

Other West African students I met in Cairo fell somewhere between the extremes represented by Mohammed and Sheku. Many of the more recent arrivals who were not partly Egyptian like Sheku had followed family connections to expatriate Arabic speakers or Muslims in their countries, such as Lebanese traders. Some of them had been raised in these people's houses. For these young men, other Arab countries had sometimes been intermediate points in their journeys. Even among the younger generation, it was mostly men who had come to Egypt—the younger Sierra Leonean women were either the offspring of mixed marriages contracted by an earlier generation of African male immigrants or the rare wife whose husband's seasonal employment in Gulf states had enabled him to bring her from "home." Some of these men had been sent as domestic workers to relatives in Lebanon by their West African–based employers, and there they managed to begin their education before being granted scholarships to come to Egypt. Others had worked as couriers in illicit international businesses, such as diamond smuggling for the Lebanese or money laundering for illicit Saudi interests. Having acquired fluency in Arabic and links to Arab states (not to mention Muslim religious networks) in the process, they were now enjoying the fruits of their labor by advancing their education in modern Egyptian universities. Many younger students had bypassed the official scholarship route and funded their studies with income from these business ventures. Some had bought passports rather than face the delays of official bureaucratic channels.

Note that the practice of buying passports usually amounted to "buying time" and did not necessarily entail falsification of the kind that landed Solomon Musa, the Sierra Leone immigration official discussed in an earlier section, in a Hong Kong jail. He had engaged in falsification of documents and identity by granting diplomatic passports to Hong Kong businessmen who were not diplomats. He had falsified their occupations, if not their names (as Sierra Leonean authorities had suspected Mohammed of doing when he applied for a new passport under a different name and when he went to claim his scholarship). But in most cases I came across, "buying passports" meant using money to lubricate bureaucratic channels, to expedite paperwork—hence buying time. As Mohammed pointed out when we met in Cairo, he had *paid* for his name change by waiting nine months and two weeks in Khartoum while a new passport was being issued.

The journeys of many others I met in Cairo seemed to be shorter and quicker, partly because air travel was more accessible in 1980s and 1990s Africa—especially for urban-based people—than it had been in the 1960s for Mohammed, an illiterate rural teenager. But the journeys were sometimes no more straightforward. The mode of transportation was more direct, but the travelers often had to engage in detours they neither planned nor wanted because of arbitrary interventions of state agents or bureaucrats at crucial spatiotemporal junctures. These travelers, too, had experienced stretches as illegal workers, dangerous brushes with criminals or the police in foreign countries, and summary

expulsions with the excuse that they carried "invalid" documents. In particular, the fact that they used air travel for each leg of their trips deferred for them questions about national belonging that for Mohammed were raised differently every time he crossed successive land borders. They had to face these questions only when departing and arriving at "sanitized" customs and passport checkpoints at foreign international airports. Because these are shared with all categories of passengers, including the elite who can afford rapid air travel, these "checkpoints" may appear to be run according to more efficient, less arbitrary principles than remote land border crossings.

But the state's control over territory and time, even in these zones of apparently rapid transit, becomes apparent as soon as a "problem" is found in a traveler's documents. Some of the young men in Cairo told harrowing stories about being isolated in the much less sanitized environment of separate rooms or buildings, to which only state authorities had access, in the zones d'attente of the Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris. There, once again, the state took control over time. Once confined in these "waiting areas," as the term zone d'attente implies, the men lost control over the time they had cleverly "bought" by paying for an airline ticket instead of other means of transport, by expediting their passport and visa applications, and so on.

CONCLUSION

The state's control over territory and populations is often experienced as control over space-time—the duration of passports, visas, scholarships, residence and work permits, and so forth. One key additional "state effect," then, is the state's capacity to appear eternal—indeed "thinglike" in its eternity—in its powerful determinations of who might and might not have access to what, in its role as gatekeeper, even when the door or gate its agents guard appears to be democratically and transparently open to the deserving among the multitudes. In "Before the Law," a much analyzed section in *The Trial,* Kafka portrays "the man from the country" arriving to consult the law and finding the door open but watched by an imposing guard, who tells him that he may go in if he wants but will not be able to get past other doors or guards inside. The man ends up waiting for the rest of his life, outside the open door to the law, to be granted permission to enter. Law, too,

operates this way then, apparently open but playing for time (and with time) to limit access and determine the outcome of cases. Who "has time" to bring a court case, for instance, against a government that unlawfully denies one a document or access to a territory? If one has money, one pays for a lawyer's time—carefully clocked to the minute at hourly rates—to follow through a case. Otherwise, one invests enormous amounts of one's own time and knowledge. But even then, education is key: it is significant that Kafka portrays the man in a lifelong wait to gain access to the law as a peasant, not an urban dweller. The man from the country in Kafka's story is Mohammed, not Sheku. But ultimately both of them simply got up and went to a different door, even though in Kafka's story, the guard tells the man from the country, just before he dies, that this particular access to the law had been there exclusively for him and would after his death close forever.

Thus, if the "state effect" and "law effect" are partially operative on the level of controlling narratives of lived time and literally making people wait (Mohammed, for his passport and then his scholarship; Sheku, for his scholarship), they are also about singularizing relations with people. States control populations and territories, and supranational entities such as humanitarian organizations and international bodies like the UN, the World Trade Organization, and so on, exercise other governmental forms of control, but they often do so through a logic of singularization. Passports and other documents tend to place people within "populations" (the census is a good example, classifying people as it does by age, occupation, and so forth), but they also serve to singularize identities and fix them in time—rigidly so, in fact, since a single passport cannot accommodate the multiple names that over the course of a person's life span often signal important identity transformations. Instead, each change requires a new passport. The state allows the individual to change name, marital status, appearance, and so forth, but it can accommodate only a single facet at any given time and requires the document to be changed with every change in identity. The US attorney general argues for renewing Sierra Leone's TPS designation on the basis of specific estimated counts of individual "eligible applicants" and on the claim that refugees from particular areas are "special cases" at any given time and, as such, deserve to be treated as exceptions to normal immigration laws. The whole logic of the

decision on the exception—if we take seriously Schmitt's argument that it has to serve as a *general* theory of the state's authority and not merely as applying to "states of emergency"—is one of singularization, for each exception must be decided on a case-by-case basis and not for an entire class of phenomena.

In this process of singularization, the state effect works differently on different citizen-subjects. The issue of race came to the fore in my discussion of changing UK immigration laws in the transition from an almost exclusively "White Commonwealth" to a slightly more café-au-lait one once the South Asian colonies attained independence in 1947–1948 (triggering the Nationality Act of 1948) and ending with the African independences in the 1950s and early 1960s (which brought about the 1962 and 1968 Immigration Acts). Finally, the 1971 Immigration Act, a prelude—perhaps a prerequisite?—to Britain's joining the European Union, explicitly distinguished between white and nonwhite citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies by requiring a "direct link of descent by blood with the UK" in order for former subjects to gain access to its territory (Hope 1997). But another singularizing effect acts along the axis of gender.

The fact that matters of citizenship are determined according to paternity in Egypt and Sierra Leone, or that taxation in rural Sierra Leone applies only to (mostly male) heads of household, means that male and female subjects experience the "state effect" differently in these contexts. The Egyptian mothers of Sheku and those like him who are noncitizens despite being born of mixed marriages suffered the effects of the state's exclusionary practices in the most intimate spheres of their lives. They experienced them as the sudden disruption of their domestic and affective lives, a kind of deterritorialization of the heart when a short visit back home by a foreign husband and an Egyptian-born child—as the journey that took Sheku to Sierra Leone at age eight was supposed to be—became a twelve-year separation. The sudden illness and then death of Sheku's father during their journey to Sierra Leone left the son in the hands of his paternal relatives for the rest of his formative years, with his Egyptian mother unable to get him back. My stay in Cairo was punctuated by encounters with other such mothers, who in the knowledge that I would be going from there to Sierra Leone plied me with names, pictures, and messages for stranded

children from mixed marriages, children who sometimes suffered more than others the uncertainties and displacements of the unfolding civil war.

Aspects of Mohammed's and Sheku's bureaucratic and legal entanglements are common to the migrant experience, and in some ways this is precisely the point: if all states, no matter how close they appear to be in their functioning to modal parliamentarian, totalitarian, or socialist (and so on) states, subject their citizens to a greater or lesser extent to the "blockages" and detours, the loss of time experienced by these and other Sierra Leonean migrants and refugees, then weighing in on the relative strength or weakness of a state, or whether it is "solid" or "shadow," is a somewhat misplaced effort. Furthermore, though Mbembe may be right to argue that the regime of impunity developed in colonial and postcolonial African states became a historically specific phenomenon because of the ways in which it was grafted onto the political economy and (socialized) memory of slavery and the forms of racism it generated, it would be misleading to draw the conclusion from this argument that there is such a thing as a state that does not act with impunity. All states, as Deleuze and Guattari point out, are integrated "intra-consistently" at different points and on different levels, and perhaps to different degrees—depending on the context and historical moment—in ways that constitute more a system of resonances that produce an overall "state effect" (in Mitchell's words) than something of consistency in the other sense of the term, something with a certain firmness, even solidity. Even the "weak" Sierra Leonean state made its effects felt locally as well as on the global scene and produced an interiority as well as an exteriority in the experiences of its citizens—including those, like Mohammed, who had spent the better part of their lives out of its territory. For "it is a vital concern of every State...to control migrations and, more generally, to establish a zone of rights over an entire 'exterior,' over all the flows traversing the ecumenon" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:385; see also Sassen 1998), and it is at the very least in this sense—in the exterior and at the global level—that the state operates as an apparatus of capture. This does not mean that the state is reducible to foreign policy "or a set of relations among States" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:360), because in its exterior manifestations it is always also pulled toward internalizing and appropriating locally. It

is always situated between different polarities. Among these, the urban-rural polarity is a key one upon which many others are mapped in order to produce the "state effect"—hence Kafka's representation of the man denied access to the law as being "from the country," not to mention Mamdani's bipartite model of postcolonial African states as polarities between mostly urban citizens having access to "The Law" and rural subjects ruled by native administrations through the colonial invention of customary law.

But the state effect is also ecumenical in its reach. The absence of a Sierra Leonean embassy in Khartoum in the 1960s or in Cairo in the 1990s slowed efforts by holders of that country's passports to secure traveling or identity papers. But the closure of the American embassy in Freetown during the 1991–2002 civil war and its aftermath also brought about spatial detours and added (wasted) time for US citizens in Sierra Leone, who had to travel to Abidjan or Conakry to regularize their papers. Their experiences of such complications may not have been as traumatic as they were for Mohammed, the man from the country, or for some of his fellow Cairo-based Sierra Leoneans, who literally died there while waiting for a chance to return "home" to Sierra Leone, or even for the Cairo-born Sheku. The point remains that both Sierra Leonean and American citizens are subject to these forms of capture once they find themselves in the ambiguous zones devoid of rights that all states produce. In these ambiguous zones there are also possibilities for flight, and it is here that the reconstitution of subjectivity beyond the categories of citizenship, refugees, and migrants can unfold.

Notes

1. On the idea of l'état falsificateur, see Hibou (1997).

2. See Michel Galy (1998) for the Liberian case, understood as a "per version" of the relationship with the "war machine" that Deleuze and Guattari argue must ultimately remain separate from—albeit susceptible to being captured by—the state apparatus.

3. See Ferme (1998:563–65) and Fyfe (1962). Fanthorpe (2001:380) discusses early-twentieth-century policies of the colonial state in this regard and the use of tax receipts as identification during that period.

4. Sierra Leonean students in Cairo were organized in the Sierra Leone Student Union (SLSU), a group with some four hundred members. Of these, just under fifty were officially enrolled at al-Azhar. By comparison, there were about 340 Senegalese students among the 6,400 foreign students at the university (al-Azhar University 1991:26–40). Many of those not officially enrolled either were lapsed students or were in the process of acquiring the necessary competence in Arabic and educational qualifications to gain admission to the university.

5. The designation of Sierra Leonean citizens under TPS began in October 1997 under then Attorney General Janet Reno (Department of Justice 1997:59736–37). Like all emergency provisions, TPS designation must be revised regularly, in this case annually. In September 2003, Sierra Leone's TPS status was revoked, effective May 3, 2004, by the Department of Homeland Security, under whose jurisdiction such matters now fall (Federal Register 2003).

6. Passport dealings of the sort attempted by Mr. Musa became more difficult with the introduction in May 2001 of state-of-the-art, falsification-proof, and machine-readable passports in Sierra Leone. For a conceptual and material history of the passport, especially with reference to the state's relative interest in surveillance of populations and their mobility within its territory (for instance, between rural and urban areas) as opposed to beyond national borders, see Torpey (2000).